Bob Brackett：伊朗冲击下的天然气、LNG与大宗商品链
Bob Brackett on Nat Gas, LNG and the Iran Shock
Joe Weisenthal: Hello and welcome to another episode of the Odd Lots podcast.
Joe Weisenthal：大家好，欢迎收听新一期《Odd Lots》播客。
Tracy Alloway: So, Joe, the war in Iran is primarily, at least from a commodity standpoint, being understood as an oil shock. That is the number most people are paying attention to.
Tracy Alloway：Joe，从大宗商品视角看，伊朗战争目前主要被理解为一次油价冲击。大多数人现在盯着看的，基本就是这个数字。
Joe Weisenthal: That is the headline, sure. But as we know from multiple episodes we have already done, it is not just an oil region. We have talked about fertilizer. We did an episode on other dry-bulk commodity shipping affected by the closure, or near closure, of the Strait of Hormuz. There is plenty there. It is not just an oil story.
Joe Weisenthal：这当然是最大的 headline。但正如我们前几期节目已经讨论过的，这里绝不只是一个“产油地区”。我们聊过化肥，也做过一期关于霍尔木兹海峡关闭、或者接近关闭后，其他干散货大宗商品航运受影响的节目。这里涉及的东西非常多，绝不仅仅是石油故事。
Tracy Alloway: Yeah. The one silver lining, I guess, is that we are all becoming commodities and supply-chain experts, and petrochemicals experts as well. I should say we are recording this on March 17, because who knows what will happen by the time this episode comes out. But one of the big headlines today is that Iran has struck one of the big gas fields in the UAE, the Shah field in the Empty Quarter area, and it is on fire. The footage is pretty dramatic, which definitely focuses the mind on one particular commodity, which is gas.
Tracy Alloway：是的。要说还有什么“一线好处”，大概就是我们都被迫变成了大宗商品专家、供应链专家，顺便还成了石化专家。顺带说一句，我们这期录制于 3 月 17 日，因为等节目正式播出时，谁也不知道局势会变成什么样。但今天的一个大 headline 是，伊朗袭击了阿联酋的一处大型天然气田，也就是位于 Empty Quarter 地区的 Shah 气田，而且现场已经起火。画面非常震撼，也确实会把大家的注意力集中到另一种关键商品上，那就是天然气。
Joe Weisenthal: There are sort of two dimensions to the supply-chain disruption, are there not? There is the fact that, for the most part, very few vessels are going through the Strait of Hormuz, and people are wondering when that will reopen. But then there is the separate question of how much core infrastructure of various sorts has been damaged. Setting aside when the strait reopens, how badly will the production infrastructure be impaired, and how long will that last?
Joe Weisenthal：供应链扰动其实有两个维度，对吧？一个维度是，眼下基本已经没有多少船还能穿越霍尔木兹海峡，大家都在猜它什么时候才能重新开放。另一个维度则是，许多核心基础设施本身已经遭到破坏。也就是说，即便先不谈海峡什么时候恢复通行，生产端的基础设施到底受损有多严重、又要多久才能恢复，这本身就是另一条独立的线索。
Tracy Alloway: Right. And I think natural gas in particular already had geopolitical connotations even before the war with Iran. We are all used to thinking about big strategic pipelines and potential disruptions to those. Back when Russia invaded Ukraine, there was obviously a European gas crisis, and so everyone is kind of worried about Europe once again.
Tracy Alloway：没错。而且天然气这种商品，在伊朗战争爆发之前本来就自带浓厚的地缘政治属性。我们都已经习惯从大战略管道的角度去思考它，也习惯担心这些管道会不会被打断。俄罗斯入侵乌克兰时，欧洲显然就经历了一场天然气危机，所以现在所有人又一次开始担心欧洲。
Joe Weisenthal: Yes. There is a lot to discuss. I also saw a headline today on the train about how Pakistan is in a very serious situation because it only has about a month of natural-gas supply right now and is heavily dependent on gas from the region. Of course, there is also the fertilizer story we learned about, with urea downstream from natural gas, and so on. Anyway, last year we did our live episode with one of our favorite commodities guests, Bob Brackett. As we were walking out of the theater, I said, “Bob, we have to get you back on for an episode and just pick one commodity.” He said, “Next time I am on, let’s talk about nat gas.” And I said, “All right.”
Joe Weisenthal：是的，能聊的东西太多了。我今天在地铁上还看到一个 headline，说巴基斯坦的情况已经非常严峻，因为它眼下大概只剩一个月左右的天然气供应，而且它对本地区气源高度依赖。当然，还有我们之前学到的化肥逻辑，比如尿素本身就是天然气下游，诸如此类。总之，去年我们做现场节目时，请来了我们最喜欢的大宗商品嘉宾之一 Bob Brackett。我记得散场走出剧场时，我跟他说：“Bob，我们得再请你回来，专门做一期，就挑一种商品聊。”他说：“我下次来，咱们聊天然气吧。”我说：“好，就这么定了。”
Tracy Alloway: And so it turns out that now is the perfect time for the perfect guest.
Tracy Alloway：结果现在看来，时机正好，嘉宾也正好。
Joe Weisenthal: The perfect time for the perfect guest. We are going to be speaking with Bob Brackett, managing director and senior research analyst covering North American oil and gas exploration and production and global metals and mining at Bernstein Research. Bob, thank you so much for coming back on Odd Lots.
Joe Weisenthal：是的，完美嘉宾配上完美时点。今天我们要请到的是 Bernstein Research 董事总经理兼高级研究分析师 Bob Brackett，负责北美油气勘探与生产，以及全球金属和矿业研究。Bob，非常感谢你再次回到《Odd Lots》。
Bob Brackett: Thanks for having me. Joe, thanks for having me. Tracy.
Bob Brackett：谢谢邀请。Joe，谢谢，Tracy，也谢谢你们。
Joe Weisenthal: When I said we should do an episode on one commodity at that time, why did your mind immediately go to nat gas? Was that already the big story in your mind?
Joe Weisenthal：当时我说我们可以专门做一期、只聊一种商品时，你为什么第一反应就是天然气？那在你脑子里当时已经是最重要的主题了吗？
Bob Brackett: One, and I have told clients this, I am most useful when I am least loved. The problem with being a cyclical commodity analyst is everyone asks about whatever is highest on the screen. That is the thing most likely to mean revert lower. The money has already been made there. You should be looking at the things nobody is talking about. So I would argue that today Henry Hub, U.S. natural gas — not the LNG stuff that is shut in, not the other commodities — Henry Hub is unloved.
Bob Brackett：第一点，我一直跟客户说，我最有用的时候，往往正是我最不受欢迎的时候。做周期性大宗商品分析师有一个问题：所有人都会来问屏幕上涨得最高的那个东西。而那往往恰恰是最可能均值回归、往下掉的那个，钱大概率已经赚过了。你真正应该看的，是那些没人怎么谈论的品种。所以我会说，今天的 Henry Hub，也就是美国本土天然气——不是那些已经 shut-in 的 LNG，也不是别的商品——Henry Hub 现在就是那个不受待见的东西。
Bob Brackett: It is sitting at around $3 per mcf while all these underlying demand drivers are building in the U.S. So it is the forgotten molecule today.
Bob Brackett：它现在大概就在每千立方英尺 3 美元附近徘徊，但与此同时，美国内部却在不断累积各种需求驱动因素。所以在今天，它就是那个“被遗忘的分子”。
Tracy Alloway: The forgotten molecule. But broadly speaking, you were pretty spot on on nat gas. I remember last year you turned bullish after something like 15 years of being bearish. I know you are too modest to say you were right, but directionally things seem to be going your way.
Tracy Alloway：“被遗忘的分子。”不过更宽泛地说，你在天然气上的判断确实相当准。我记得去年你是在看空了大概 15 年之后，第一次真正转向看多。我知道你太谦虚，不会直接说自己判断对了，但方向上看，市场似乎确实在朝着你说的方向走。
Bob Brackett: I have been at Bernstein covering the energy space for going on 15 or 16 years. For most of that time, we had giant disruptions. First we had shale gas, where the whole oil-and-gas complex was drilling and going down the learning curve on how to frack gas and get it out. We drove the cost of shale gas down to around $3.50 per mcf. Then shale oil came along and effectively gave away the associated gas from oil-directed drilling. A big chunk of the cost curve does not really care what the gas price is because gas is just a byproduct. There are even times when Waha gas prices go negative. That does not slow the oil drilling.
Bob Brackett：我在 Bernstein 覆盖能源行业，已经快 15、16 年了。过去这段时间，大部分时候我们面对的都是巨大的供给扰动。最先是页岩气革命，整个油气行业都在拼命打井、走学习曲线，研究怎么压裂、怎么把气采出来。结果就是我们把页岩气成本一路压到了每千立方英尺大约 3.5 美元。然后又轮到页岩油崛起，它基本上把油井伴生气白送给了市场。因此，在整个成本曲线里，有很大一块其实根本不在乎天然气价格是多少，因为气只是副产品而已。甚至在某些时点，Waha 天然气价格都能跌成负值，但这也不会让石油钻井停下来。
Bob Brackett: Finally, you are starting to see some light. In the same way that the shale-oil industry became better behaved around 2018, the shale-gas industry — especially the Haynesville shale on the Louisiana-Texas border — is starting to behave itself. In a world where you have strong structural demand drivers to the upside and discipline on the supply side, that is a nice time to come into a sector.
Bob Brackett：直到最近，你才终于开始看到一些曙光。就像页岩油行业大概在 2018 年左右开始变得更守纪律一样，页岩气行业——尤其是位于路易斯安那和得州交界处的 Haynesville 页岩——现在也开始变得有纪律了。在一个上有强劲结构性需求、下有供给纪律约束的世界里，这正是一个非常适合重新进入这个板块的时点。
Joe Weisenthal: Amazing. Perfect setup. One more setup question. I was thinking about this on the way in. When I think about oil, there are different grades and various prices, but basically there is one global oil price and everything trades at some spread to it depending on geography and quality. My impression — tell me if I am wrong — is that with gas it is the opposite. There is more or less one gas, but there is absolutely not one global market because the supply chain is radically fractured.
Joe Weisenthal：太好了，铺垫得很完整。我还有一个背景性问题。我来之前一直在想这个。石油这个东西，虽然也有不同油种和不同价格，但基本上你还是可以说全球只有一个油价，其他油种只是根据地理位置和品质，在这个价格基础上有一点差异。我的印象是，天然气正好相反——气本身差异没那么大，但绝对没有一个统一的全球市场，因为它的供应链被切得非常碎。我的理解对吗？
Bob Brackett: Exactly. Think about oil. A VLCC, a very large crude carrier, holds 2 million barrels of oil. At $100 oil, the cargo is worth $200 million, and the cost of moving it halfway around the world is a few dollars a barrel. For a couple of percent of value, you can deliver oil anywhere.
Bob Brackett：完全对。你想想石油。一个 VLCC，也就是超大型原油运输船，可以装 200 万桶原油。按 100 美元一桶来算，一船货就值 2 亿美元，而把它运到地球另一边的成本，也不过是每桶几美元。只花货值的几个百分点，你就能把油运到世界任何地方。
Bob Brackett: Gas is totally different. The cost of getting shale gas out of the Marcellus from two miles down and two miles out might be under a dollar. Then it takes a couple more dollars to get it to Henry Hub through pipelines. If I want to ship it internationally, I have to liquefy it for maybe another $2.50, then pay maybe $1.50 more to load it, ship it, and regasify it. In gas, 80% or 90% of the cost is in the movement.
Bob Brackett：天然气就完全不同了。把 Marcellus 页岩里的气从地下两英里深、横向两英里长的井里采出来，成本可能不到 1 美元。然后你还得通过管道花上两三美元把它送到 Henry Hub。要是我想把它运到国际市场，那还得再多花大约 2.5 美元把它液化，再加上可能 1.5 美元把它装船、运输并再气化。也就是说，在天然气链条里，80% 到 90% 的成本都花在“移动”这件事上。
Tracy Alloway: Wow.
Tracy Alloway：哇。
Bob Brackett: That is why oil has something like the law of one price. The relative value of the cargo versus the shipping cost is trivial. With gas, it is all a game of distance and market access. There is no one global gas price.
Bob Brackett：这就是为什么石油大体上服从“单一价格法则”。货值相对于运费来说太大了，所以运输成本只是边角料。而天然气完全取决于运输距离和市场可达性，所以根本不存在一个统一的全球气价。
Tracy Alloway: Can you situate us on Iran’s place in the gas complex? We think about Iran as a commodity player, but a somewhat unreliable one because of sanctions and all the rest. And natural gas is volatile on its own. So what exactly is Iran’s role here?
Tracy Alloway：你能不能先帮我们定位一下伊朗在全球天然气体系中的位置？大家当然知道伊朗是个大宗商品国家，但它又一直是个不太稳定、或者说不太可靠的参与者，因为制裁之类的问题一直都在。而天然气本身又已经够波动了。所以，伊朗在这个体系里到底扮演什么角色？
Bob Brackett: We are talking about the largest gas field on the planet. The Qataris call it North Field, and it extends into Iranian territory. Geologically, it is one giant structure. Operationally, it is absolutely not shared, but geologically it is the same field.
Bob Brackett：我们说的其实是地球上最大的天然气田。卡塔尔人把它叫作 North Field，而这个构造延伸进伊朗境内。从地质上看，它就是一个完整的超大型气藏。运营上当然完全不是一起开发，但从地质结构上，它就是同一个田。
Bob Brackett: The numbers get huge very quickly. A large LNG vessel might hold 6 bcf. A medium one might hold 4 bcf. A very good Haynesville or Marcellus well might produce 20 bcf over its life. So a single really good U.S. shale well might load four or five LNG cargos over its lifetime. Now take that times a thousand, and you start to get a sense of the scale of North Field.
Bob Brackett：只要一算数字，规模就会大到惊人。一个大型 LNG 船可能能装 60 亿立方英尺，普通一点的也能装 40 亿立方英尺。一口非常优秀的 Haynesville 或 Marcellus 页岩气井，整个生命周期产量大概在 200 亿立方英尺左右。换句话说，一口很好的美国页岩气井，一辈子大概也就装满四五船 LNG。你再把这个量级乘以一千，差不多就能体会 North Field 到底有多大了。
Joe Weisenthal: And that field is shared by Qatar and Iran, just to be clear?
Joe Weisenthal：所以为了说清楚一点，这个气田在地质上是卡塔尔和伊朗共享的，对吗？
Bob Brackett: Geologically, yes. Operationally, no. The Qatari side comes back into Qatar, gets liquefied there, gets loaded on ships, goes east through the Strait of Hormuz, and usually ends up in Asia.
Bob Brackett：从地质上讲，是的；从运营上讲，不是。卡塔尔那一侧的天然气被送回卡塔尔境内，在那里液化、装船，然后从霍尔木兹海峡往东运，通常最终流向亚洲。
Joe Weisenthal: That is what I wanted to ask. Since the market is so fragmented, where does it all go and whom does it compete with?
Joe Weisenthal：这正是我想问的。既然天然气市场这么割裂，那这些气具体都卖到哪里去？它在那些市场里又是和谁竞争？
Bob Brackett: The global LNG market is about 500 million tons per year. The big three powers in LNG are Qatar, the U.S., and Australia. Qatar has the lowest-cost gas in the world. The condensate byproduct helps pay for the field. They sign very long-dated contracts around the world, especially into Asia.
Bob Brackett：全球 LNG 市场大概是每年 5 亿吨。LNG 的三大强国是卡塔尔、美国和澳大利亚。卡塔尔拥有全球最低成本的天然气资源，伴生凝析液本身还能替气田分摊不少成本。他们在全球范围内签了很多超长期合同，尤其是面向亚洲。
Bob Brackett: The U.S. came along with a very different model. Historically, if you were a Japanese utility sitting on an island, you needed something to burn for power generation. You could import oil, fuel oil, diesel, or gas. For decades, LNG contracts were linked to oil because the buyer was broadly indifferent across those fuels. The U.S. broke that model. It said: buy Henry Hub gas, pay us to liquefy it on the Gulf Coast, and a merchant can capture the arbitrage wherever the cargo goes.
Bob Brackett：美国后来带来的是一套完全不同的模式。历史上，如果你是日本的公用事业公司，身处一个岛国，你的核心需求就是得有东西可以烧来发电。你可以进口原油、燃料油、柴油，也可以进口天然气。正因为买方在这些燃料之间大体上是可替代的，所以几十年来 LNG 合同一直都是油价挂钩。美国打破了这个模式。它的逻辑是：你买 Henry Hub 的气，付钱让我在墨西哥湾沿岸把它液化，然后由贸易商来捕捉这批货最终运往何处的套利空间。
Bob Brackett: That made U.S. LNG a much more spot-oriented business than the heavily contracted Qatari model. So when Asia suddenly loses Qatari volumes because of force majeure, buyers start saying, “Fine, I will burn someone else’s LNG. If I cannot get that, I will burn coal, fuel oil, diesel — whatever I need for electrons.”
Bob Brackett：这使得美国 LNG 变成了一个比卡塔尔长期合同模式更偏现货化的生意。所以，当亚洲因为 force majeure 突然拿不到卡塔尔气时，买家就会说：“好吧，那我去烧别人的 LNG；如果还拿不到，那我就烧煤、烧燃料油、烧柴油——总之我得先把电发出来。”
Tracy Alloway: Speaking of arbitrage, with so many different benchmarks and now this dislocation, are you seeing weird price moves that people can exploit?
Tracy Alloway：说到套利，在眼下这么多不同定价基准、又出现了这种供给错位的情况下，市场上有没有出现什么奇怪的价格波动，让人可以去做一些套利交易？
Bob Brackett: We are still nowhere near the levels we saw when Russia invaded Ukraine. European gas prices — call it TTF into the Netherlands — have not come close to those peaks. Part of that is seasonality. Back then, the Russians invaded in February, at peak winter demand. Now we are heading into shoulder season, when weather is mild in the Northern Hemisphere and demand is lower.
Bob Brackett：现在还远远没有到俄罗斯入侵乌克兰时那种价格水平。欧洲天然气价格——比如说荷兰 TTF——还没接近当时的高点。其中一个原因是季节性。那次冲击发生在 2 月，正值冬季需求高峰；而现在我们正进入 shoulder season，也就是春秋这种北半球气温相对温和、天然气需求较弱的时段。
Bob Brackett: Another reason is that Europe has already weaned itself off a lot of Russian gas and feels like it has more options. We will see how that changes as we move into summer.
Bob Brackett：另一个原因是，欧洲这几年已经在相当程度上摆脱了对俄罗斯天然气的依赖，因此会觉得自己现在手里的选项比以前更多。至于到了夏天以后这种局面会不会变化，那还得再看。
Joe Weisenthal: Let’s talk about the rise of U.S. LNG exports. How much have exports scaled up versus, say, 2016 or even 2021 before Russia invaded Ukraine? And how much more capacity is coming online in the next few years?
Joe Weisenthal：我们来聊聊美国 LNG 出口的崛起。和 2016 年、或者哪怕是俄罗斯入侵乌克兰之前的 2021 年相比，美国现在的出口规模到底扩大了多少？接下来几年又还有多少新增产能要上线？
Bob Brackett: There is a neat anecdote here. Right now Qatar is not selling much LNG because of the conflict, but there is a terminal called Golden Pass in Texas that is 70% owned by Qatar and 30% by Exxon. It used to be an import terminal. Because of shale gas, the whole strategy flipped, and now it is an export terminal. It is loading now. So one of the next cargos Qatar effectively sells may be a Texas cargo rather than a Qatari cargo.
Bob Brackett：这里有个挺有意思的小故事。眼下卡塔尔本土因为冲突原因没法正常卖出太多 LNG，但得州有一个叫 Golden Pass 的终端，70% 归卡塔尔，30% 归埃克森美孚。它原本是一个 LNG 进口终端。后来因为美国页岩气革命，整个逻辑彻底翻转，它现在成了一个出口终端，而且已经开始装船了。所以，卡塔尔接下来真正卖出去的下一船 LNG，很可能不是卡塔尔本土装出的货，而是来自得州的货。
Bob Brackett: More broadly, total U.S. gas supply and demand is about 120 bcf per day. A few years ago, LNG exports were maybe 10% of that. We are now getting close to 20%, and by 2030 we will add multiple more bcf per day. LNG is the fastest-growing piece of U.S. gas demand.
Bob Brackett：更广泛地说，美国天然气总供需规模大概是每天 1200 亿立方英尺。几年前，LNG 出口大概只占其中 10% 左右；而现在我们已经快接近 20% 了。到 2030 年之前，这个数字还会再增加好几个 bcf/日。所以，LNG 已经成为美国天然气需求里增长最快的那一部分。
Tracy Alloway: One of the controversies around export terminals was always that if you start exporting too much gas, you tighten the domestic market and raise the local price. Has the rise of LNG exports meaningfully lifted Henry Hub?
Tracy Alloway：围绕出口终端的一个长期争议是：如果你开始大量出口天然气，你就会收紧国内市场，从而抬高美国本土气价。那过去这些年 LNG 出口的上升，有没有实质性地推高 Henry Hub？
Bob Brackett: I wish. That is the dream of every E&P investor. Henry Hub is still around $3 entering shoulder season. It got to $5 or $6 during the winter, but there is no strong evidence that moving exports from 10% of demand to 20% of demand has structurally changed the price. What determines price is where supply equals demand, and up until now the supply side has been perfectly willing to hand the market as much gas as it wants at around $3.50.
Bob Brackett：我倒希望是这样。那可是所有上游 E&P 投资者的梦想。可现实是，我们现在进入 shoulder season，Henry Hub 还只有 3 美元左右。冬天最紧张的时候确实上过 5、6 美元，但并没有强有力的证据表明，出口占比从 10% 提高到 20%，就已经结构性地改变了美国天然气价格。价格真正取决于的是供需平衡落在哪个点上，而到目前为止，供给侧仍然非常愿意以每千立方英尺大约 3.5 美元的成本，持续给市场提供足够多的气。
Bob Brackett: What may be changing is the long-run inventory story. Shale oil and shale gas are finite resources. The learning curve has done a lot of work. That chapter is maturing. So if you are a planner looking five or ten years out, you do need to think about replacing that inventory.
Bob Brackett：真正可能变化的，是长期资源库存的故事。页岩油和页岩气终究是有限资源。过去这些年学习曲线已经释放了很多红利，那一章正在逐步走向成熟。所以，如果你是一个做 5 到 10 年规划的人，你确实得开始考虑未来怎么补充这部分资源库存。
Joe Weisenthal: How elastic is demand for natural gas? In the Northeast, I think of it as something I simply have to buy to heat my house. But there must be some marginal demand that depends on the price.
Joe Weisenthal：天然气需求到底有多大的弹性？我作为一个住在美国东北部的人，会觉得这就是冬天取暖时必须买的东西，除非我突然学会自己去砍柴。但我想总该有一些边际需求，是会对价格变化做出反应的吧？
Bob Brackett: What consumers really want is electricity. So the substitution happens among fuels. A big thing bubbling under the surface right now is thermal coal, which is up around 30% year to date. What happened after Russia invaded Ukraine? Europe bought every LNG cargo it could. Asia was then short power fuel and said, “Fine, we will burn more coal.” So yes, there is elasticity, but it first shows up as fuel substitution.
Bob Brackett：消费者真正想要的，其实是电。所以弹性主要体现在不同燃料之间的替代。现在一个在水面下逐渐升温的现象是动力煤价格，今年迄今已经涨了大约 30%。俄罗斯入侵乌克兰之后发生了什么？欧洲把能买到的每一船 LNG 都吸走了，亚洲于是面临发电燃料短缺，就只能说：“好吧，那我们多烧点煤。”所以，天然气需求当然有弹性，但它首先表现出来的形式，是燃料之间的替代。
Bob Brackett: At much higher prices, you would also get outright demand destruction. But people really like electricity and air conditioning, so that threshold is pretty high.
Bob Brackett：价格再高得多的时候，当然也会出现真正意义上的需求毁灭。但问题是，人们真的很喜欢电，也真的很喜欢空调，所以那个阈值其实并不低。
Tracy Alloway: Just on the infrastructure-damage question: how much of Qatari production do you think could be impaired in the medium term?
Tracy Alloway：回到基础设施受损这个问题上。你怎么看卡塔尔产量在中期内可能受到多大程度的影响？
Bob Brackett: LNG facilities have momentum in both the engineering sense and the operational sense. We have good experience with this on the U.S. Gulf Coast. A hurricane comes through, you shut the facility, then you bring it back. Oil and gas assets are generally built for turnarounds. If this disruption lasts weeks, then we are talking about a wedge of maybe a month or so of chaos flowing through the system.
Bob Brackett：LNG 设施这类东西，在工程和运营上都有很强的“惯性”。美国墨西哥湾沿岸对此其实很有经验。飓风来了，终端先停下来，等风过去再慢慢恢复。油气资产通常本来就是按可以停开、检修、再启动的思路来设计的。所以如果这次扰动只持续几周，那我们大概面对的就是一个持续一个月左右的混乱缺口，通过整个系统往下传导。
Bob Brackett: If it goes on for months and months, then you are taking out something like 20% of global LNG supply. If you think of the big three — the U.S., Qatar, Australia — each is roughly a fifth of global supply. You would then need a lot of coal, or you would need demand destruction.
Bob Brackett：但如果它一拖就是几个月，那你基本上就等于拿掉了全球大约 20% 的 LNG 供应。因为如果把美国、卡塔尔和澳大利亚这三大玩家看作核心供应方，它们各自差不多都占全球供应的五分之一左右。那种情况下，你就必须找到大量煤炭来替代，否则就只能接受需求被强行压下去。
Tracy Alloway: Commodity markets are very used to fading Middle East flare-ups very quickly. Is there any reason to think this time is different?
Tracy Alloway：大宗商品市场一直以来都习惯了对中东冲突做“很快就会过去”的交易处理。你觉得这次有什么理由会不一样吗？
Bob Brackett: I am a geologist, not a geopolitician, so I am probably not the perfect guest for that question. What the market is saying right now is that we are returning to normal. Whether the market is right or wrong, I do not know.
Bob Brackett：我是地质学出身，不是地缘政治专家，所以这个问题我可能不是最完美的回答者。市场当前给出的答案是：一切最终会恢复正常。至于市场到底对不对，我并不知道。
Bob Brackett: I do have some signposts. In oil, when you take the crude price and add the crack spread — effectively what the consumer pays for gasoline and diesel — and that total gets to around 7% of global GDP, the world says, “That is too much,” and demand gives way. In 2022 we got there. Today we are not there yet, but if we did get to something like $120 crude with a $60 crack, then alarm bells would really start ringing.
Bob Brackett：但我确实有一些观察路标。以石油为例，如果你把原油价格和 crack spread，也就是消费者最终为汽油、柴油支付的加工价差加在一起，当这个总成本升到全球 GDP 的大约 7% 时，世界经济通常就会说：“这太贵了。”然后需求就会开始扛不住。2022 年我们就碰到过这种水平。今天还没有走到那一步，但如果原油涨到 120 美元，裂解价差再有 60 美元左右，那警报就真的会响起来。
Joe Weisenthal: Geopolitics is basically a fake field, isn’t it? Geology feels more like a real science.
Joe Weisenthal：地缘政治基本上算是一门“伪学科”，不是吗？相比之下，地质学听起来倒更像是一门真正的科学。
Bob Brackett: Geology does not change when you talk about it. Geopolitics changes when you talk about it. The observer affects the experiment.
Bob Brackett：地质学不会因为你开口讨论它而发生变化；地缘政治却会因为你谈论它而改变。观察者会影响实验本身。
Joe Weisenthal: Here is something I have wondered. Even if there is not one global gas market, has the rise of LNG made the different regional gas markets more correlated over time? Are we gradually moving toward a global gas price?
Joe Weisenthal：我一直在想另一件事。即便天然气还没有统一的全球市场，但随着 LNG 崛起，不同地区的天然气市场是不是已经越来越相关了？我们是不是正在慢慢走向某种“全球天然气价格”？
Bob Brackett: Yes, to a degree. Think of what Saudi Aramco does in oil when it looks east and west and sets official selling prices. Qatar plays a similar linking role in LNG because it can sell both east and west and because it has more customers than almost anyone else. So we increasingly have something like a law of one seaborne gas price, even if pipeline gas remains local.
Bob Brackett：从某种程度上说，是的。你可以想想沙特阿美在石油市场上的角色——它会同时看东边和西边的价格，再去设定官方售价。卡塔尔在 LNG 市场里起的作用有点类似，因为它既能向东卖，也能向西卖，而且它的客户网络比大多数玩家都广。所以，虽然管道气依然高度本地化，但海运 LNG 确实正在越来越接近一种“单一海运天然气价格”的格局。
Tracy Alloway: What is actually going on with Russian LNG in Europe? You hear two very different stories: one says Europe is phasing out Russian imports, and the other says Russian imports are at record highs.
Tracy Alloway：那俄罗斯 LNG 在欧洲到底是什么情况？因为你会听到两套完全不同的叙事：一种说欧洲正在逐步淘汰俄罗斯进口，另一种却说俄罗斯进口其实创了新高。
Bob Brackett: If Russian crude is effectively getting a free pass during this conflict, then Russian LNG probably will as well. Buyers care about security of supply, and one lesson utilities have learned is that diversity of supply is security of supply. If you had tied yourself 100% to Qatar because they gave you the best price, that would have been a bad decision in hindsight.
Bob Brackett：如果说在这轮冲突中，俄罗斯原油事实上拿到了某种“默认放行”，那俄罗斯 LNG 大概率也会是类似逻辑。买家最在乎的是供给安全，而公用事业公司过去几年学到的一条核心教训就是：供应多元化，本身就是安全的一部分。如果你之前因为卡塔尔给的价格最好，就把自己 100% 绑定在卡塔尔身上，那么从今天回头看，那显然是个糟糕决定。
Bob Brackett: Russia still has a lot of gas. With pipeline gas, you are in a marriage because the pipe goes from point A to point B and cannot move. LNG is different. It lets you have lots of customers with benefits instead of one fixed partner.
Bob Brackett：俄罗斯手里依然还有很多天然气。管道气的问题在于，它更像一段婚姻：管道从 A 点到 B 点，搬不走，所以供需双方基本就是绑定关系。LNG 不一样。它让你不必只和一个固定对象绑定，而是可以同时拥有很多“有利益关系的客户”。
Joe Weisenthal: After Russia invaded Ukraine, Europe went around buying every LNG cargo it could find and poorer countries got shut out. What happened next? What did those countries do?
Joe Weisenthal：俄罗斯入侵乌克兰之后，欧洲四处扫货，把市场上几乎所有 LNG 船货都买走了，很多较贫穷国家因此被挤出市场。那接下来发生了什么？这些国家怎么办？
Bob Brackett: There are roughly two tons of regas demand for every one ton of liquefaction capacity in the world. That is because liquefaction is extremely capital intensive — roughly $1,000 per ton of annual capacity — whereas regasification is maybe one tenth of that. So lots of countries can build regas terminals as an option, but the real bottleneck is liquefaction.
Bob Brackett：全球大概存在这样一个比例：每 1 吨液化能力，对应着差不多 2 吨再气化需求。这是因为液化端极其资本密集，每吨年化产能的投资大概要 1000 美元左右，而再气化终端的成本可能只有它的十分之一。所以，很多国家都可以先把 regas 终端建起来，作为一种“未来也许能用上的选择权”，但真正卡脖子的环节永远是液化能力。
Bob Brackett: When the market gets tight, two buyers can easily end up fighting over every one cargo. Whoever pays more gets it. If you come in second, your answer is usually coal.
Bob Brackett：于是，一旦市场收紧，就很容易出现每一船货背后有两个买家在抢的局面。谁出的价更高，谁就把货拿走。如果你最后排在第二名，通常你的答案就只剩下煤。
Tracy Alloway: I am going to change the subject slightly. In the grand tradition of us interviewing Bob, I am going to throw out a random commodity: sulfur and sulfuric acid. One reason I ask is that when I was in Abu Dhabi, I remember ADNOC striking offtake deals for sulfur. I used to think of sulfur as this useless byproduct of crude oil, but it turns out to be very useful because you can make sulfuric acid from it, and sulfuric acid matters for things like microchip etching. So what is happening with sulfur right now?
Tracy Alloway：我打算稍微换个题，延续我们每次采访 Bob 时的传统——随手抛一个随机商品出来。这次我想问的是硫和硫酸。原因之一是，我之前在阿布扎比时，记得 ADNOC 曾经给硫做过一些 offtake 协议。我以前一直把硫当成原油里顺手带出来、似乎没什么用的副产品，但后来才发现它其实很有用，因为你可以把它做成硫酸，而硫酸又会用于像芯片蚀刻这样的环节。所以现在硫市场到底是什么情况？
Bob Brackett: The craziest thing in sulfur right now is that the Shah gas field in the UAE is on fire. That gas is about 25% hydrogen sulfide. It is a very sour gas field. Historically, if you went out to a sour-gas well site, everybody had to shave so the protective gear would fit properly. Shah is one of the biggest sources of H2S around, and it is also around 10% CO2. That is a huge safety and environmental issue.
Bob Brackett：眼下硫市场最疯狂的一件事，就是阿联酋的 Shah 气田着火了。那个气田的天然气里大约有 25% 是硫化氢，也就是一个典型的高含硫气田。以前如果你去这种 sour gas 井场，所有人都得把胡子刮干净，因为防护设备必须贴脸才行。Shah 是全球最大的 H2S 来源之一，而且它的气体成分里还有大约 10% 的二氧化碳。这在安全和环境上都是非常大的风险。
Bob Brackett: More broadly, sulfur itself is not scarce. You have sulfur all over the place. Copper smelters produce sulfur because a lot of copper ore comes in sulfide minerals. In the old days they would just release the sulfur dioxide and make the stack tall enough that acid rain spread over a bigger area. Now you capture it. Right now many copper smelters are making real money from sulfuric acid byproduct revenues because treatment charges are so weak.
Bob Brackett：更广泛地说，硫本身并不稀缺。你到处都能找到硫。铜冶炼厂本身就会产生大量硫，因为很多铜矿石都是硫化物矿。早年间大家只是把二氧化硫直接排出去，然后把烟囱建得足够高，让酸雨落得更分散一点。现在当然都会回收。眼下很多铜冶炼厂之所以还能赚点钱，恰恰是因为硫酸副产品本身提供了收入来源，而不是因为铜精矿加工费有多好。
Bob Brackett: Most sulfur eventually goes into agriculture. Ammonium sulfate is both an explosive and a fertilizer. In places like Kazakhstan, uranium production competes with agriculture for sulfuric acid. So you can have local tightness. But globally we are not running out of sulfur.
Bob Brackett：大多数硫最终还是会流向农业。比如硫酸铵，既可以是炸药原料，也是一种很好的化肥。在哈萨克斯坦这类地方，铀矿生产就会和农业一起争夺硫酸资源。所以局部市场当然会有紧张的时候，但从全球角度讲，我们并没有“快要把硫用光”。
Joe Weisenthal: I love doing this. Since you basically know every commodity, let me ask another one. Are there any other weird commodities we should be watching right now? I saw a Bloomberg headline about zinc prices. Anything else shooting up?
Joe Weisenthal：我太喜欢这种环节了。既然你基本上什么商品都懂，那我再随手问一个：除了这些之外，现在还有哪些奇怪的商品值得盯着？我好像今天还看到 Bloomberg 的 headline 说锌价在飙。还有什么别的东西也在往上冲？
Bob Brackett: Aluminum is one obvious one. When Russia invaded Ukraine, people immediately asked what share of global nickel, PGMs, palladium, and so forth Russia produced. This time around, the Middle East is not really a big miner west of the Strait of Hormuz, but it is a very important processor. Aluminum is basically solid electricity. Most of the cost of making aluminum is the electricity to run the smelter, so you put aluminum smelters where energy is cheap.
Bob Brackett：铝当然是一个非常明显的品种。俄罗斯入侵乌克兰时，大家第一反应是去查俄罗斯占全球镍、铂族金属、钯金等等的产量份额。而这一次，中东在霍尔木兹海峡以西并不是一个特别大的矿产开采区，但它却是非常重要的加工区。铝这种商品，某种意义上就是“固体电力”。因为生产铝的大部分成本都来自电解铝环节所消耗的电力，所以铝冶炼厂通常会建在能源特别便宜的地方。
Bob Brackett: That is why you see very large aluminum smelters in places like Bahrain, using cheap local natural gas. Zinc smelters are somewhat similar, though not quite as energy intensive. So when the Middle East goes from being a source of cheap energy to a source of disruption, those metals feel it.
Bob Brackett：这就是为什么像巴林这类地方会有非常大型的电解铝厂，因为那里可以使用便宜的本地天然气。锌冶炼和这个逻辑也有点类似，虽然它没有铝那么极端地依赖电力。所以，当中东从“廉价能源来源地”变成“能源扰动来源地”时，这些金属自然都会感受到冲击。
Tracy Alloway: Why did zinc bar tops ever become a thing? In London it used to feel like a marker of a nice bar.
Tracy Alloway：顺便问一句，为什么锌吧台面板曾经会变成一种“高级感象征”？在伦敦，好像一个酒吧只要用了锌台面，就会显得特别讲究。
Bob Brackett: They may end up ripping those out and converting them back into metal if prices go high enough.
Bob Brackett：如果价格涨得足够高，说不定大家真会把那些吧台面板拆下来重新回炉炼成金属。
Joe Weisenthal: Let’s talk about the domestic U.S. energy infrastructure angle. Since Liberation Day and all the tariff turmoil, we have heard stories from manufacturers about the fluctuating cost of steel and how that complicates planning. What has been the effect of tariffs on the cost of domestic energy infrastructure?
Joe Weisenthal：我们再聊聊美国国内能源基础设施这一侧。自从 Liberation Day 以及随后的关税动荡以来，我们听到过不少制造业公司的说法，说钢价波动让他们很难做规划。那从国内能源基础设施建设的角度看，关税到底带来了什么影响？
Bob Brackett: For the most part, energy has been somewhat exempt. Yes, there have been aluminum tariffs, steel tariffs, and the threat of copper tariffs. But the oil patch and gas patch have mostly been left alone. So when the industry set budgets this year, it was mostly responding to the oil price on the screen, not to tariffs.
Bob Brackett：在很大程度上，能源行业其实算是相对被豁免的一块。没错，确实有铝关税、钢关税，也有过铜关税威胁，但油田和气田这边总体上没有直接被重锤打到。所以，今年行业做资本预算时，主要还是看屏幕上的油价，而不是围绕关税来定计划。
Tracy Alloway: One thing we heard from the Trump administration coming in was that it was going to be very energy-friendly — friendly to all molecules, whether coal or gas or whatever. Have we actually seen policies that are helping those industries? Do people in the sector feel good about it?
Tracy Alloway：特朗普政府上台时，有一个非常鲜明的口号就是“对能源友好”——无论是煤、天然气还是别的分子，统统友好。那现实中，我们真的看到有政策在帮助这些行业吗？业内人士的感受是积极的吗？
Bob Brackett: I would argue that bombing Iran is a pro-oil-price policy. That took a year and a half, but there you go.
Bob Brackett：我会说，轰炸伊朗本身就是一种“有利于油价”的政策。虽然这条路径花了一年半才走到这里，但结果就是这样。
Tracy Alloway: Ex-war domestic policies, I mean.
Tracy Alloway：我说的是，先把战争因素放在一边，单看美国国内政策。
Bob Brackett: There is a tension there. Trump likes low oil prices and low gasoline prices because he is very sensitive to that politically, but he is also rhetorically pro-oil. That is a narrow path. A reasonable mid-cycle oil price might be $75 to $80 — enough for marginal producers to earn a return. We have mostly been below that for much of the Trump period and even much of the post-Ukraine period because OPEC has been adding barrels and demand has been only tepid.
Bob Brackett：这里面本来就有一种张力。特朗普在政治上非常在意低油价、低汽油价，但与此同时，他在口头上又是非常支持石油行业的。这其实是一条很窄的平衡木。一个合理的油价中枢，大概应该是每桶 75 到 80 美元，足以让边际生产者赚到合理回报。但在特朗普执政的大部分时间里，甚至在俄乌冲突之后相当长的一段时间里，油价其实都低于这个水平，因为 OPEC 一直在往市场里加桶，而需求又只是偏疲弱。
Bob Brackett: The real thing that gets someone to drill more in Texas is the return. Permitting may have improved. People in the patch will say approvals are faster. But what really changes rig count and frac spreads is the economics.
Bob Brackett：真正能让得州多打一口井的，从来还是回报率。审批流程或许确实改善了，油田里的很多人也会告诉你，现在拿批文比以前快一些。但真正决定钻机数、压裂队数量的，始终还是经济性。
Joe Weisenthal: One of the big themes since COVID has been that every shock encourages countries to think more about sovereignty and resource security. Does that mean we are going to live with the ramifications of the last six years in commodity markets for a very long time?
Joe Weisenthal：自疫情以来，一个非常大的主题就是：每一次冲击都会进一步刺激各国去思考主权、安全和资源保障。这是否意味着，我们会在未来很多年里都持续承受过去六年这段时期对全球大宗商品市场带来的后果？
Bob Brackett: If you go back to the First World–Second World era, you had two partially redundant supply chains for a lot of commodities — Soviet smelters and Western smelters, Soviet processing and Western processing. Then in the 1990s you had the collapse of the Soviet Union just as China began rising. That meant China’s demand supercycle was fed by a lot of under-managed, under-utilized excess capacity. All you needed was a little capitalism applied to old Soviet assets.
Bob Brackett：如果你回到“第一世界—第二世界”那个年代，你会发现很多大宗商品其实都有两套部分冗余的供应链——苏联有自己的冶炼厂，西方也有自己的冶炼厂；苏联有自己的加工体系，西方也有自己的加工体系。然后到了 1990 年代，苏联解体恰好撞上中国开始崛起。于是，中国后来的需求超级周期，某种程度上就是靠全球这批管理松散、利用率又偏低的过剩产能喂起来的。你只需要在那些旧苏联系统资产上稍微加一点资本主义管理，它们就能重新开始高效运转。
Bob Brackett: Now we are almost reversing that. We are saying China cannot be the only place that processes rare earths; the U.S., Japan, Malaysia, and others need their own capacity. We are talking about domestic copper security. We may be entering a long cycle of rebuilding duplicated, inefficient, more secure supply chains. That is capital intensive and inflationary.
Bob Brackett：而现在，我们几乎是在把这条逻辑反过来走。我们开始说，中国不能是唯一一个拥有稀土加工能力的地方；美国、日本、马来西亚以及其他国家都需要自己的产能。我们开始讨论国内铜资源安全。也就是说，我们很可能正在进入一个长期周期：重新建设那些重复的、效率更低但安全性更高的供应链。这件事本身既资本密集，也天然具有通胀性。
Joe Weisenthal: All right, one last tiny question, and Tracy is going to love it. Do you watch Landman?
Joe Weisenthal：好，最后一个小问题，Tracy 一定会喜欢。你看《Landman》吗？
Bob Brackett: I have watched it. I tend to binge-watch when I get the chance. I binge-watched the first season. I have not yet done that with the second.
Bob Brackett：我看过。我一般是一有机会就集中 binge-watch。第一季我是一次性刷完的，第二季我还没这么干。
Joe Weisenthal: Does it feel realistic to you?
Joe Weisenthal：那它看起来真实吗？
Bob Brackett: My lived experience has very little overlap with Landman.
Bob Brackett：我的现实人生经验，和《Landman》里的世界其实重叠得并不多。
Tracy Alloway: I just want to say that a significant portion of my life right now is spent listening to Joe talk about that show.
Tracy Alloway：我只想说，我现在生活里有相当大一部分时间，都是在听 Joe 聊那部剧。
Joe Weisenthal: I am obsessed with it. I love Landman so much. Anyway, Bob, thank you so much for coming back on Odd Lots. It is always a true pleasure.
Joe Weisenthal：我真的对它着迷了，我太爱《Landman》了。总之，Bob，非常感谢你再次回到《Odd Lots》，永远都是一种真正的享受。
Bob Brackett: Thank you so much, Joe. Thanks, Tracy. That was great as always.
Bob Brackett：太感谢了，Joe，谢谢 Tracy，一如既往地聊得很开心。
Tracy Alloway: That was great, as always.
Tracy Alloway：一如既往，太精彩了。
Joe Weisenthal: I love talking to Bob so much. One thing with a lot of energy episodes is that energy math is not intuitive to me. I have a hard time conceptualizing what a billion cubic feet actually is, and with natural gas, especially once you start converting through liquefaction and all the rest, I find the units really hard.
Joe Weisenthal：我真的太喜欢和 Bob 聊天了。很多能源类节目里，我最大的困难之一就是，能源的单位和数量对我来说并不直观。我很难真正想象“十亿立方英尺”到底有多大，而天然气一旦再加上液化、再气化这些转换步骤之后，那些单位就更难在脑子里建立直觉了。
Tracy Alloway: It is really hard. I absolutely sympathize. I was one of those toddlers who would try to stick the triangle piece into the round hole. I have always struggled to visualize shapes and sizes.
Tracy Alloway：真的很难，我完全能共情。我小时候就是那种会把三角形积木硬往圆孔里塞的幼儿。我一直都很不擅长在脑子里形象化地理解尺寸和形状。
Joe Weisenthal: We are word cells, not shape cells.
Joe Weisenthal：我们属于“语言型细胞”，不是“形状型细胞”。
Tracy Alloway: Exactly. But a bunch of things stood out from that conversation. One thing I should clarify is that I did not mean to make light of the fact that the war is hugely beneficial to U.S. energy. Isabella Weber had that paper on where the value of higher oil prices flows, and a lot of it flows to U.S. energy companies.
Tracy Alloway：完全正确。不过刚才那段对话里，有几件事对我印象特别深。其中一点我想补充澄清一下：我不是想轻描淡写地带过“这场战争对美国能源行业是巨大利好”这件事。Isabella Weber 之前有篇论文，专门分析高油价所带来的价值最终流向谁，其中很大一部分最后确实都流向了美国能源公司。
Joe Weisenthal: Trump basically said that himself in one of his Truth Social posts. He was like, “We are actually going to make more money.” Most people are not oil producers; most people are oil consumers, so they do not like higher gasoline prices. But he explicitly spun it as a benefit because the U.S. is now a net energy exporter between crude and LNG.
Joe Weisenthal：特朗普自己其实也在 Truth Social 上差不多这么说过。他的意思大概就是：“这会让我们赚更多钱。”当然，大多数人并不是石油生产者，而是石油消费者，所以没有人会喜欢更高的汽油价格。但他确实明确地把这件事包装成利好，因为美国现在在原油和 LNG 合计意义上已经成了净能源出口国。
Tracy Alloway: And it brings us back to that episode we recorded on how the closure of the Strait of Hormuz affects China’s economy. The more these supply disruptions and choke points materialize, the more governments are going to want to accelerate renewables and other things that are less exposed to this kind of shock.
Tracy Alloway：而这又让我们回到之前那期节目：霍尔木兹海峡关闭会如何影响中国经济。供应中断和“咽喉要道”风险越是不断具象化，各国政府就越会想加快推进可再生能源，以及其他那些更不容易受此类冲击影响的体系。
Joe Weisenthal: Another point I had not appreciated until Bob said it was that China’s rise in the 1990s and 2000s benefited from the glut of capacity left over from the former Soviet sphere. The combination of globalization and that available capacity was a huge gift to the global economy.
Joe Weisenthal：还有一点，是 Bob 说出来之后我才真正意识到的：上世纪 90 年代和 2000 年代中国的崛起，其实受益于前苏联体系留下来的那批过剩产能。全球化和那批可被重新利用的产能结合在一起，对全球经济来说几乎就是一份大礼。
Tracy Alloway: The 1990s were a special time. Everything was just working out.
Tracy Alloway：90 年代真的是一个非常特殊的时期。那时候好像什么事情都在往正确方向发展。
Joe Weisenthal: Peak humanity.
Joe Weisenthal：那简直是“人类巅峰时刻”。
Tracy Alloway: All right, should we leave it there?
Tracy Alloway：好，那我们就先聊到这里？
Joe Weisenthal: Let’s leave it there.
Joe Weisenthal：就到这里吧。
Tracy Alloway: This has been another episode of the Odd Lots podcast. I am Tracy Alloway. You can follow me at Tracy Alloway.
Tracy Alloway：这里是又一期《Odd Lots》播客。我是 Tracy Alloway，你可以在社交平台上关注我。
Joe Weisenthal: And I am Joe Weisenthal. You can follow me at The Stalwart. Follow our producers Carmen Rodriguez, Dasha Shchel Bennett, and Kale Brooks. For more Odd Lots content, go to bloomberg.com/oddlots. We have a daily newsletter on all of our episodes, and you can chat about these topics 24/7 in our Discord at discord.gg/oddlots.
Joe Weisenthal：我是 Joe Weisenthal，你可以在社交平台上关注我 `@TheStalwart`。也欢迎关注我们的制作人 Carmen Rodriguez、Dasha Shchel Bennett 和 Kale Brooks。想获取更多《Odd Lots》内容，可以访问 [bloomberg.com/oddlots](https://www.bloomberg.com/oddlots)。我们有一份每日 newsletter，总结所有节目内容；你也可以加入我们的 Discord 社群，在 `discord.gg/oddlots` 里全天候讨论这些话题。
Tracy Alloway: And if you enjoy Odd Lots, if you like it when we get Bob Brackett on to answer random commodity questions, then please leave us a positive review on your favorite podcast platform. And remember, if you are a Bloomberg subscriber, you can listen to all of our episodes ad-free. Just find the Bloomberg channel on Apple Podcasts and follow the instructions there. Thanks for listening.
Tracy Alloway：如果你喜欢《Odd Lots》，如果你喜欢我们把 Bob Brackett 请来回答各种随机大宗商品问题，那就请在你常用的播客平台上给我们留下一个好评。也提醒一下，如果你是 Bloomberg 订阅用户，你可以无广告收听我们的全部节目。你只需要在 Apple Podcasts 里找到 Bloomberg 频道，并按照那里的说明操作即可。感谢收听。